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STATEMENT OF RELATED PARTIES 
Appellant named Dole Food Company, Inc. and Dole Fresh Vegetables, 
Inc. as defendants to this action. The court below dismissed these defendants 
through summary judgment. (R. 285-86). Appellant is not appealing the granting 
of summary judgment to these defendants. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellee Dan's Super Markets, Inc. ("Dan's") agrees with the Statement of 
Jurisdiction contained in Appellant Marlene Yirak's principal brief. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED, STANDARD OF REVIEW, AND 
PRESERVATION BELOW 
1. Did the trial court properly grant summary judgment to Dan's on Mrs. 
Yirak's product liability claims because Dan's was a passive retailer of the 
prepackaged lettuce that allegedly contained a shard of glass? 
Appellant correctly states the standard of review for this issue. Appellate 
courts review grants of summary judgment for correctness. WebBank v. 
American Gen, Annuity Serv. Corp,, 2002 UT 88, 54 P.3d 1139. 
This issue was preserved at R. 99-101, Dan's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
2. Did Mrs. Yirak's failure to bring her product liability claims within two 
years after knowledge of her harm and her injury constitute an alternative 
basis for dismissal of her claims against Dan's? 
The appellate court also reviews this issue for correctness. 
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This issue was preserved at R. 247-49, the Memorandum Decision and 
Order dismissing Mrs. Yirak's strict liability claim against Dole Food Company, 
Inc. and Dole Fresh Vegetables, Inc. ("the Dole Defendants"). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES OR RULES 
Regarding the second issue on appeal, the determinative statute is Utah 
Code Ann. §78-15-3(1989): 
A civil action under this chapter shall be brought within two years from the 
time the individual who would be the claimant in such action discovered, or 
in the exercise of due diligence should have discovered, both the harm and 
its cause. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court 
Below. 
Mrs. Yirak brought this product liability action in April 2005 against Dan's 
and the Dole Defendants. (R. 1-7) She alleged that on May 20, 2002, she was 
eating salad from a prepackaged bag of Dole lettuce that she had purchased at 
Dan's a couple of days beforehand. She claimed that while she was eating the 
salad, she bit into a sliver of glass that was in the lettuce, resulting in physical 
injury. (R. 8-12) Her causes of action were for negligence, strict liability, and 
punitive damages. (R. 8-12) 
After the parties conducted discovery, Dan's moved for summary judgment 
in August 2006, on the ground that it was a passive retailer and therefore could not 
be liable to Mrs. Yirak for any defective condition in the prepackaged bag of 
lettuce. (R. 99-101) The Dole defendants moved for summary judgment in 
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October 2006, contending that Mrs. Yirak did not file her lawsuit within the two-
year statute of limitations for product liability actions set forth in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-15-3. (R. 152-54) 
Judge Randall Skanchy of the Third Judicial District Court heard oral 
argument in December 2006, on Dan's Motion for Summary Judgment. On 
January 17, 2007, Judge Skanchy granted summary judgment to Dan's on the 
ground that Dan's was a passive retailer because Mrs. Yirak "failed to present any 
admissible evidence that Dan's knew or should have known that the product 
Plaintiff alleges injured her was defective or unreasonably dangerous at the time it 
was sold to Plaintiff. . . ." (R. 251-52) 
In April 2007, Judge Robert Faust of the Third Judicial District Court 
dismissed Mrs. Yirak's negligence claim against the Dole defendants, noting that 
Mrs. Yirak "has presented absolutely no evidence to support her claim of 
negligence against these defendants." (R. 282-84) Judge Skanchy had previously 
dismissed the strict liability claim against the Dole Defendants on January 12, 
2007, ruling that Mrs. Yirak had missed the two-year statute of limitations for 
product liability actions. (R. 248) 
Mrs. Yirak appealed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to Dan's 
on May 30, 2007. (R. 291-92) 
B. Statement of Facts 
On May 18, 2002, Mrs. Yirak purchased a prepackaged bag of Dole lettuce 
from her local Dan's grocery store. (R. 102, 139) She did not notice any holes in 
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the bag. (R. 112) Later that day, her children opened the bag and consumed part 
of the lettuce without incident. (R. 112) 
On May 20, 2002, Mrs. Yirak emptied the rest of the lettuce from the bag 
into a bowl and ate it. (R. 116) At some point while eating the salad, her mouth 
began bleeding, and she sustained lacerations to her tongue. (R. 116). She spit 
out what she was eating, and her sister later found a "thin sliver" of glass in what 
she had spit out. (R. 112, 116, 119) 
Mrs. Yirak is not aware of any other Dan's customers or any other 
consumers in the country who have found glass in a bag of Dole lettuce. (R. 115-
16) She has since purchased Dole lettuce in prepackaged bags from Dan's and has 
not found any foreign objects. (R. 116) 
In support of its motion for summary judgment, Dan's produced an 
affidavit from store director Thomas Carillo. (R. 128-29) Mr. Carillo testified 
that Dan's employees do not manufacture, design, repackage, label or inspect the 
Dole's prepackaged lettuce that are sold at the store in question. (R. 128-29) 
Moreover, the store had never received a report from a customer other than Mrs. 
Yirak that there was glass in a bag of the packaged lettuce. (R. 128-29) Mrs. 
Yirak did not dispute any of the facts alleged in Dan's motion for summary 
judgment, including those contained in Mr. Carillo's affidavit. (R. 139) She did 
not present any evidence that the piece of glass found its way into the bag while in 
Dan's possession. (R. 139-42) 
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The trial court granted summary judgment to Dan's, stating that "Dan's was 
a passive retailer within the meaning of Sarins v. Butterfield Ford, 2004 UT App. 
203, 94P.3d301." 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT P. Mrs. Yirak's appeal hinges upon the speculation that the glass sliver 
could have entered the bag while in Dan's possession. She argues that Dan's 
cannot be considered a passive retailer because of her theory that Dan's could 
have caused the product, the prepackaged lettuce, to become defective. 
Significantly, Mrs. Yirak has no evidence whatsoever that Dan's put the glass in 
the bag of lettuce. She does not even contend that she has any evidence; rather, 
she states that her product liability claims should go to a jury so that it can 
speculate about how and when the glass entered the bag. Speculation is not 
enough to sustain a product liability lawsuit, and it was proper for the trial court to 
grant summary judgment to Dan's. Dan's is a passive retailer because it did not 
know and had no reason to know that there was a glass sliver in the sealed bag. 
POINT IP Even if it were permissible for a plaintiff to take a case to the jury 
simply with conjecture and no evidence, Mrs. Yirak missed the statute of 
limitations for product liability lawsuits. The injury occurred on May 20, 2002, 
and she was aware at the time of who could potentially be at fault and what caused 
her injury. She did not file her lawsuit until April 6, 2005, missing the statutory 
deadline by nearly a year. It would therefore be appropriate for this Court to 
sustain the summary judgment on this alternative ground. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I: DAN'S WAS A PASSIVE RETAILER OF THE PREPACKAGED 
BAG OF LETTUCE AND IS NOT LIABLE TO MRS, YIRAK IN 
PRODUCT LIABILITY, 
Mrs. Yirak notes that "[t]his is a products liability action." (Appellant's 
Brief, p. 3.) She sued Dan's for negligence and strict liability for selling a product 
that allegedly contained a defect, a sliver of glass. The parties agree that Dan's is 
a retailer, but they disagree whether Dan's is a passive retailer, such that it has no 
liability for the allegedly defective condition in the bag of lettuce. 
In opposing Dan's motion for summary judgment and on appeal, Mrs. 
Yirak argues that Sanns v. Butterfield Ford, 94 P.3d 301 (Utah Ct. App. 2004) has 
no applicability here because that case is supposedly limited to cases involving 
manufacturing or design defects. (R. 140-41) She additionally argues that Dan's 
cannot be a passive retailer "if" the glass entered the bag while in Dan's 
possession. (Appellant's Brief, p. 6.) 
Her two arguments overlap in that both stem from the commonsense notion 
that a retailer must do something wrong in order to be held liable in product 
liability; if there is no evidence of wrongdoing, a retailer must be dismissed. 
Namely, in Sanns, the Utah Court of Appeals held that a retailer cannot be sued 
for negligence or strict liability if it is a passive retailer who did not create the 
manufacturing or design defect. Id. at 307-08. It defined a "passive retailer" as a 
seller of a product who does not know, and has no reason to know, of a defective 
condition. Id. at 307-08. Similarly, if there were admissible evidence that the 
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glass entered the bag while in Dan's possession, that could potentially raise the 
question of whether Dan's knew or should have known about the defective 
condition.1 However, Mrs. Yirak's appeal must fail because she has no absolutely 
no evidence that Dan's was responsible for the defective condition of the bag of 
lettuce. 
A. SANNS IS APPLICABLE TO BOTH MRS. YIRAK'S 
NEGLIGENCE AND STRICT LIABILITY CLAIMS 
1. Dan's Cannot be Negligent Under the Sarins Analysis 
Because It Did Not Owe a Duty of Care to Mrs. Yirak. 
In Sarins v. Butterfield Ford, the plaintiff sued Butterfield Ford, a Ford 
automobile dealership, for negligence and strict liability. Mr. Sanns was a 
passenger in a Ford van that rolled several times, causing him personal injury. Mr. 
Sanns also sued Ford for strict liability and negligence. The trial court granted 
summary judgment to Butterfield Ford on both claims, and the Utah Court of 
Appeals upheld the ruling. 
This Court treated each claim separately, dealing with Mr. Sanns' 
negligence claim first. The Court of Appeals recognized that the concept of actual 
or constructive knowledge of a defect is pertinent in determining whether 
Butterfield Ford could be liable for negligence. Citing to House v. Armour of Am., 
Significantly, such evidence would not automatically mean that Dan's knew or should have known about 
the glass. For example, if Mrs. Yirak had produced evidence that a rogue customer intentionally inserted 
the glass in the bag while it was on the shelf at Dan's, but there was no evidence that Dan's knew of it and 
did nothing or that Dan's received any forewarning that this could happen, summary judgment in Dan's 
favor would be appropriate. This analysis is similar to that found in premises liability law, where a 
storeowner owes no duty as a matter of law to a customer who is injured on the premises if there is no 
evidence that the storeowner knew or had reason to know of the dangerous condition on the premises. See, 
e.g. Merino v. Albertsons, Inc., 1999 UT 14, 975 P.2d 467; Cory v. Smith Food King Store, 531 P.2d 360 
(Utah 1973). 
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Inc., 886 P.2d 542, 547 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), this Court emphasized that "[a] duty 
to warn a consumer of a defective product lies with a seller . . . of a product who 
'knows or should know of a risk associated with its product.'" Sanns, 94 P.3d at 
304. This Court observed that the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 401 also 
espouses the concept that retailer liability arises when the seller "knows or has 
reason to know that the [product] is, or is likely to be, dangerous." Sanns, 94 P.3d 
at 304 n.3. If a plaintiff has no evidence that the seller knew or should have 
known of a defect with the product, the seller does not owe a duty of care to the 
purchaser, and a negligence claim fails as a matter of law. Id. at 304. 
Mr. Sanns produced no evidence that Butterfield Ford had actual or 
constructive knowledge of a defect in the van. While Butterfield Ford knew the 
particular van had a higher center of gravity than most other vehicles, common 
sense dictates that most vans have higher centers of gravity than other vehicles, 
and there was no evidence that Butterfield Ford knew or should have known that 
the particular model of van contained a manufacturing or design defect that made 
it susceptible to rollovers. Id. at 304. Because the plaintiff could not show that 
the retailer "was anything but a passive retailer of the vehicle," the Court of 
Appeals determined that the trial court had correctly granted summary judgment to 
Butterfield Ford on the negligence claim because it owed no duty of care as a 
matter of law. Id. at 305. 
Similarly, Mrs. Yirak has no evidence that Dan's knew or should have 
known that the prepackaged bag of lettuce contained a sliver of glass. To her 
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credit, she does not pretend to have such evidence. On the other hand, Dan's 
produced testimony from the store director explaining that Dan's does not 
manufacture, design, repackage, or inspect the prepackaged bags of lettuce; and 
that no other customer had reported glass in a Dole bag before May 2002. In 
France v. Harley-Davidson, Inc., 2007 WL 1795722 (D. Utah), Judge Ted Stewart 
granted summary judgment to a motorcycle shop because these circumstances 
made it a passive retailer: 
It is undisputed that Defendants are passive retailers. Defendants did 
not participate in any design, testing, manufacturing or assembly or 
warnings in association with this or any motorcycle. . . . It is not 
disputed that Defendants performed only routine checks on the bike 
and never tampered with or altered the fuel line or any other 
component parts. 
France v. Harley-Davidson, Inc., 2007 WL 1795722 at *2. 
Sanns governs Mrs. Yirak's claim against Dan's for negligence. Just as it 
was appropriate to grant summary judgment to Butterfield Ford for lack of 
evidence that it knew or should have known of a defective condition, so the trial 
court here correctly dismissed the negligence claim. 
2. Dan's Cannot be Strictly Liable Merely for Selling a Product 
with an Alleged Defect. 
Mrs. Yirak complains that Sanns v. Butterfield has no relevance because it 
involved a lawsuit where the plaintiff sought to hold a retailer strictly liable for a 
2
 Mrs. Yirak faults Dan's on appeal for not inspecting the bags of lettuce, although she does not cite to any 
legal authority that might impose a duty upon a grocery store to inspect all of the items it sells for defects. 
She offers no details on how a grocery store could practically inspect delicate, packaged and sealed produce 
for tiny foreign objects. She does not elaborate on whether a one-time inspection of each item would be 
sufficient or whether each item would need to be checked on a daily basis. Finally, she does not suggest 
that any inspection of the bag would have actually been fruitful and revealed what she herself describes as a 
"tiny sliver." She cannot impose a duty that, with good reason, does not exist in the law. 
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manufacturing and design defect. Her complaint raises the question of what type 
of defect Mrs. Yirak is claiming. If the glass entered the bag while it was in the 
Dole defendants' possession, she ostensibly would say that the product had a 
design or manufacturing defect. If the glass entered the bag while it was in Dole's 
possession, it is hard to characterize the defect she would be claiming, and she has 
never identified the type of defect herself. One might call the defect an "alteration 
defect," in that it would have occurred after the design or manufacture of the 
product, although Dan's is unaware of any court or other legal authority 
recognizing a defect under that name.3 
Thus, Mrs. Yirak's contention that Sarins is not applicable instantly exposes 
two problems with her strict liability claim. First, it forces her to choose between 
alleging a defect that occurred while in Dole's hands and a defect that occurred 
while in Dan's hands. However, she concedes that she has no idea when the 
alleged defective condition occurred, underscoring the weakness of her case. 'The 
glass shard could have entered the bag at any time between the manufacture and 
the ultimate purchase of the salad by Mrs. Yirak from Dan's." (Appellant's Brief, 
p. 5.) "It's hard to say where the glass came from, where in the process." (R. 299, 
p. 8) Second, she may be seeking to hold Dan's strictly liable for a defect that is 
not recognized in the law, or at least for a defect that is more appropriately 
pursued through a negligence theory than a strict liability theory. See 36A C.J.S. 
3
 Utah's Product Liability Act states that "fault" can include the alteration of a product, but it addresses 
alteration by the "initial user or consumer," not by the retailer. Furthermore, it does not create a separate 
category of defect known as "alteration defect." Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-5. 
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Food § 84 (2007) ("Although a manufacturer may be held strictly liable for 
defects in food products it manufacturers and sells, a distributor or retailer who 
purchases food products in sealed packages is not liable for non-obvious defects 
absent negligence.") 
To the extent Mrs. Yirak is claiming that Dan's should be strictly liable for 
a defect that occurred while the bagged lettuce was in Dole's control, it is clear 
that Sanns precludes this claim. The Court of Appeals explained that due to the 
prohibition in the Utah Liability Reform Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-27-37, et 
seq., against a party bearing more than its share of fault, "strict liability cannot be 
apportioned to Butterfield Ford, a passive seller, and also to Ford." Sanns, 94 P.3d 
at 307. This Court therefore established that when a product manufacturer is a 
defendant in a lawsuit (as is the case here), a passive retailer cannot be sued for 
strict liability. Id. at 307-08. 
To the extent Mrs. Yirak is claiming that Dan's should be strictly liable on 
the presumption that the glass entered the bag while in its possession, regardless of 
whether it was aware of the occurrence, this also runs afoul of the Utah Liability 
Reform Act. She has no evidence that Dan's was responsible for the glass 
entering the bag, and she therefore would seek to hold Dan's accountable 
potentially for someone else's wrongdoing. Moreover, her strict liability claim 
rests upon a presumption, and nothing more. She does not know how or when the 
glass entered the bag. While strict liability is often described in terms of "liability 
without fault," that is not synonymous with absolute liability. She wishes to 
pursue Dan's based upon the mere fact that it sold a product that she says 
contained a shard of glass. She is essentially requesting that this Court create 
absolute liability for retailers, making them absolute insurers of the safety of the 
products they sell. This request is not consistent with the Utah Liability Reform 
Act or with product liability jurisprudence. See Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 
628 P.2d 1301, 1302 (Utah 1996) (strict liability is not the equivalent of making 
the manufacturer or seller absolutely liable as an insurer of the product and its 
use). 
Although the plaintiff in Sarins alleged a manufacturing or design defect, 
and Mrs. Yirak says she is not alleging either one of these, she cannot explain why 
the reasoning in Sarins would be inapplicable to whatever defect she is claiming 
here. The Sanns court noted that the passive retailer status derives from the 
principle that a nonmanufacturing defendant, who has not been shown to have 
created or contributed to the alleged defect, should not be strictly liable when the 
manufacturer has been named in the lawsuit. Sanns, 94 P.3d at 306. In other 
words, if the retailer has not done anything affirmatively or actively to cause the 
dangerous condition, but merely passed the product through the stream of 
commerce, it cannot be strictly liable. 
The trial court was correct in determining that Dan's was a passive retailer 
who cannot be liable in negligence or strict liability. There is no fact in the record 
that suggests Dan's had any fault. 
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B. MRS. YIRAK'S ALLEGATION OF WRONGDOING BY 
DAN'S IS SPECULATION UNSUPPORTED BY ANY 
EVIDENCE 
Mrs. Yirak states that Dan's cannot be a passive retailer "if the unsafe 
condition occurred while the bagged salad was within Dan's possession." 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 6.) She asks this Court to reverse the summary judgment so 
that a jury can wonder whether the glass might have entered the bag while in 
Dan's possession and if so, whether Dan's should be responsible. 
Mrs. Yirak has no evidence that the glass entered the bag while under 
Dan's control. She freely admits that the glass could have entered the bag at any 
time from the point Dole put the lettuce in the bag and sealed it to the point when 
she left the store, and that she has no idea how or when it got into the sealed bag. 
She did not notice any hole in the sealed bag when she bought the lettuce, and it is 
difficult to imagine how glass could have entered the bag at Dan's without making 
a hole. Moreover, she does not dispute Dan's evidence that it does not repackage 
or alter the bags of Dole lettuce that come prepackaged and sealed to its store. 
A party cannot survive a summary judgment motion with mere speculation 
that a defendant might have done something wrong. Utah courts have consistently 
determined that a jury cannot hear a case where there is no admissible evidence 
against a defendant, but simply theories or conjecture that the defendant might 
have been at fault. In Spews v. Fricke, 2004 UT 69, 98 P.3d 28 (Utah 2004), the 
Utah Supreme Court upheld a summary judgment granted to a driver whose 
passenger had grabbed the steering wheel and veered into oncoming traffic, 
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injuring the plaintiff. The driver submitted an affidavit that the passenger grabbed 
the steering wheel without warning during an argument. The plaintiff did not 
contest the affidavit but instead maintained that the driver could have been 
negligent for failing to reduce speed or take evasive action after the passenger 
grabbed the steering wheel. The court explained that "[w]hile such conclusions 
may be theoretically possible, [plaintiff] created no genuine issue of fact on these 
issues because it failed to introduce any evidence from which a jury could arrive at 
such conclusions." Speros, 98 P.3d at 33 (emphasis in original); see also 
Robertson v. Utah Fuel Co., 889 P.2d 1382, 1388 n.4 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) 
(affirming cited line of Utah cases stating that unsubstantiated assertions cannot 
defeat summary judgment motion). 
Similarly, Mrs. Yirak cannot pursue a lawsuit against Dan's when she has 
absolutely no evidence that Dan's did anything but innocently sell a bag of sealed 
lettuce. She has no evidence that the sliver of glass got into the bag while in Dan's 
possession or otherwise due to some act or omission of Dan's. 
POINT II: ALTERNATIVELY, THIS COURT COULD UPHOLD THE 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR FAILURE TO FILE THE LAWSUIT 
WITHIN THE STATUTORY DEADLINE, 
The trial court dismissed Mrs. Yirak's strict liability claim against the Dole 
defendants because she failed to file her lawsuit within the two-year statute of 
limitations set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-3. Mrs. Yirak suffered her injury 
on May 20, 2002, when she bit into salad allegedly containing a sliver of glass. 
She knew at the time what caused her injury and who she could potentially sue for 
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it. She nonetheless waited until April 2005, to file her Complaint, after the statute 
of limitations expired. 
The trial court did not refer to § 78-15-3 as an alternative basis for the 
dismissal of the strict liability claim against Dan's, but this Court may affirm 
summary judgment on any basis found in the trial court record. Sharon Steel 
Corp. v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 931 P.2d 127, 131-32 (Utah 1997). There is no 
reason why the statute of limitations argument that was successful for the Dole 
defendants would be inapplicable to Dan's. 
Not only is the statute of limitations an undeniable basis for affirming the 
dismissal of the strict liability claim against Dan's, it is a basis for affirming the 
dismissal of the negligence claim, as well. Although Judge Faust felt that § 78-15-
3 does not apply to products liability claims for negligence, Judge Skanchy, who 
first presided over the lawsuit, felt that it did. (R. 237) Although Mrs. Yirak 
admits that her lawsuit is a product liability lawsuit, she nonetheless argued to the 
trial court that her negligence claim should be covered by the four-year statute of 
limitations in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25 (3) "for relief not otherwise provided by 
law." 
In Bishop v. Gentec, Inc., 2002 UT 36, 48 P.3d 218, 225-26, the court 
explained that the term "product liability" includes claims for design or 
manufacturing defect, negligence or strict liability: 
Alternative theories are available to prove different categories of 
defective product, including negligence, strict liability, or implied 
warranty of merchantability . . . . Thus, allegations of negligence 
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contained in a products liability claim do not transform the claim 
into one for ordinary negligence. 
Bishop, 48 P.3d at 226. The court in Strickland v. General Motors Corporation, 
852 F.Supp. 956, 959 (D. Utah 1994) similarly held that "all claims against a 
manufacturer, based on a defective product" are subject to the two-year limitations 
period in Utah Code § 78-15-3. The Utah Product Liability Act provides a two-
year statute of limitations for "a civil action under this chapter . . . ." Utah Code § 
78-15-3. Mrs. Yirak acknowledges that her lawsuit is a product liability lawsuit, 
and her claims for negligence and strict liability are both subject to the same 
limitations period. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF REQUESTED 
Dan's was a passive retailer. It simply sold the sealed bag of Dole lettuce, 
without altering or tampering with it. It did not know or have reason to know that 
the bag contained a sliver of glass. The trial court correctly granted summary 
judgment. Dan's asks that this Court affirm the summary judgment. 
DATED this 3 D day of November, 2007. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
0< f.f- fyL. o 
Xtulianne P. Blanch 
(^Attorneys for Defendant and Appellee 
Dan's Super Markets, Inc. 
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